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were a substitution for disability compensation. Where the employee
performed regular work under stress of pain and physical incon-
venience the argument against credit is even stronger.3 3 The employee
should not be penalized for his desire and attempt to work under
such physical disability.
34
For these reasons the result of the principal case was justified as
another step in the expanding theory of compensation for work-
connected disabilities. The history of the Ditty rule indicates that
the Hayes rule should have been adopted earlier. The disappearance
of the credit rule will create an added incentive for the compensated
employee to return to work.35 The Hayes case will complement the
1948 amendment to KRS 342.11036 in the law of set-offs and deductions
against workmen's compensation awards.
Marshall P. Eldred, Jr.
ToRTs-NurisANcE-ImwmNmcE wrrH THE FLOW OF SUrFACE WATmaI
-Plaintiff and defendant own land on opposite sides of a highway.
The natural surface drainage is northwesterly across plaintiffs land,
under an abandoned fill, under the highway, and onto defendant's
land. Defendant constructed a fill across a creek on his land six
hundred feet northwest of the highway and installed several large
drainpipes. During an unprecedented rainfall, water backed up behind
defendant's fill and onto plaintiffs land, damaging a tenant house
and other property. The issue was submitted to the jury under
instructions based on negligence in the construction of the flll.1 Judg-
ment for defendant. Held: Affirmed. The civil law rule of absolute
liability for obstruction of surface waters was applicable under the
33 Id. at § 2319(c).
34 If the courts feel that credit should be allowed in some instances the test
should be that of intention. If the employer intends that wages be in lieu of
compensation and the employee is aware of this intention, credit might be allowed.
2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation § 57.41 (1960). Two such examples are: an
employee not working but receiving full wages as a gratuity; and the creation of
a position in which claimant does no work.
35 The effect, if any, of the abolition of the Ditty rule on the employer will
be insignificant. The employer who re-employes a successful claimant is protected
by KRS 342.120(5), which provides that any part of an award not paid at the
time the claimant is re-employed by the original employer shall be paid out of the
Subsequent Claim Fund.
3 6 Ky. Acts 1948, ch.64, § 11.
1The basis of the decision is not clear. The court first states that the case
was given to the jury on instructions based on negligence, and later states that
admitting the proof of the inadequacy of the pipes, the vital issue in the case
was whether or not defendant's fill caused plaintiff's flooding.
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facts of this case. Therefore, the only issue that should have been
submitted to the jury was whether defendant's fill caused the flooding
of plaintiffs land. Plaintiff was not in a position to claim error, since
he offered instructions embodying negligence as a basis for liability.
Hopson v. Downs, 340 S.W.2d 475 (Ky. 1960).
In the United States, there are three principal theories of liability
for interference with surface waters. These are the civil law rule, the
common enemy rule and the reasonable use rule. The reasonable use
rule is followed in three jurisdictions, and the remaining jurisdictions
are about evenly divided between the civil law and the common enemy
rules.
2
Kentucky follows the civil law rule which prohibits interference
with the natural flow of surface water "so as to cause an invasion of
another's interests in the use and enjoyment of his land."3 In Ken-
tucky, the rule is usually stated that the lower estate is subject to the
natural flow of surface water from the upper estate, and that the upper
owner cannot alter the natural flow so as to injure the lower owner.
4
In justification of the rule, it has been stated that any inconvenience
arising from the flow of surface water is unavoidable, and any loss
should fall according to the natural topography of the land.5
The only substantial modification of the civil law rule by the
Kentucky court has been with respect to railroad structures and em-
bankments built on easements. The court has held that a railroad is
liable for interference with surface water caused by its embankment
only when the embankment or culvert is so negligently constructed or
maintained as to be inadequate to carry off the usual and normal flow
of surface water.6
Under the common enemy rule, stated in its most extreme form,
the owner has the right to use his land as he desires, and if injury to an
adjacent landowner results from interference with the flow of surface
water, it is damnum absque injuria.7 The rule has been justified upon
2 Kinyon & McClure, Interference with Surface Waters, 24 Minn. L. Rev. 891
(1940); Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 421, 423 (1958).
S Kinyon & McClure, supra note 2, at 893.4 White v. Howe, 293 Ky. 108, 168 S.W.2d 28 (1942); Stone v. Ashurst, 285
Ky. 687, 149 S.W.2d 4 (1941); Dugan v. Long, 234 Ky. 511, 28 S.W.2d 765
(1930); Hutchinson v. Copenhaver, 193 Ky. 801, 235 S.W. 761 (1921); Johnson
v. Marcum, 152 Ky. 629, 158 S.W. 959 (1913); Pickerill v. City of Louisville, 125
Ky. 218, 100 S.W. 873 (1907).
5 Pickerill v. City of Louisville, supra note 4.
6 Chesapeake & 0. fy. v. Blankenship, 158 Ky. 270, 164 S.W. 943 (1914);
Madisonville, H. & E.R.R. v. Wiar, 144 Ky. 206, 138 S.W. 255 (1911); Walling-
ford v. Maysville & B.S. Ry., 32 Ky. L. Rep. 1049, 107 S.W. 781 (1908); Louis-
ville & N.R.R. v. Cornelius, 11 Ky. 752, 64 S.W. 782 (1901).7 Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 421, 424 (1958).
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an over-emphasis of certain rights and privileges of land ownership
and upon the public policy of favoring land improvements. 8
The fundamental problem of interference with surface waters
arises from the fact that each landowner has an interest in using his
land as he chooses and also an interest in being free from interference
with this use of his land.9 Whenever one landowner desires to inter-
fere with the flow of surface water, which would result in injury to the
other owner, these interests conflict. From the nature of the problem
someone must suffer an injury, one landowner in not being able to use
his land as he chooses, or the other landowner in damage to his land.
Both the common enemy and civil law rules attempt to solve the
problem by ignoring one of these interests of land ownership. Thus,
the civil law rule places the burden of the injury on the owner who
desires to change the natural drainage of his land, without regard to
his interest in using his land as he chooses. In striking contrast, the
common enemy rule places the burden on the owner who is injured
by the interference with surface drainage, without regard to his interest
in being free from interference with the use of his land. The unsound-
ness of each rule is indicated by the tendency of the courts to move
toward a middle ground by subjecting both rules to numerous qualifica-
tions and exceptions. 10
The reasonable use rule meets the problem by allowing a land-
owner to alter the flow of surface water so as to injure another land-
owner, provided he does so in order to make a reasonable use of his
land." A landowner is using his land reasonably if the utility of such
use reasonably outweighs the gravity of the harm to the other's land
which results from the alteration of the flow of surface waters.'2 The
court will take into account such factors as: the purpose or motive
with which the landowner acted,'8 the nature and importance of the
improvements,'14 the normal use and development of land in the im-
mediate area or locality,15 the harm to others as compared to the value
of such improvements,'16 the forseeability of such harm on the part
8 Tbid; Kinyon & McClure, supra note 2, at 898-99.
9 Kinyon & McClure, supra note 2, 905-08; Prosser, Torts § 72, at 410 (2d ed.
1955).
10 Kinyon & McClure, supra note 2, at 913. See Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 421, 423
(1958).
11Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 421, 423 (1958).
12 Johnson v. Agerbeck, 247 Minn. 432, 77 N.W.2d 539 (1956); Enderson v.
Kelehan, 226 Minn. 163, 32 N.W.2d 286 (1948); Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20
N.J. 320, 120 A.2d 4 (1956); Restatement, Torts § 826 (1938).
13 Collins v. Wickland, 251 Minn. 419, 88 N.W.2d 83 (1958).
14 Kinyon & McClure, supra note 2, at 905 n.80.
15 Collins v. Wickland, 251 Minn. 419, 88 N.W.2d 83 (1958).
16 Johnson v. Agerbeck, 247 Minn. 432, 77 N.W.2d 539 (1956).
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of the possessor,1 7 the social value of the primary purpose of the
conduct,' 8 and the cost of avoiding the injury.' 9
The superiority of the reasonable use rule warrants its adoption
in Kentucky. The rule protects each landowner by taking his interests
into consideration and protects the interests of society in assuring that
land will be developed for that activity which has the greatest utility.
20
This is in contrast with the common enemy and civil law rules, which
arbitrarily protect the interests of one landowner at the expense of the
other, and can conceivably work against the interests of society.
2 '
The rule in Kentucky which subjects railroads to liability for
obstruction of surface water, caused by negligence in the construction
or maintenance of embankments and culverts, is subject to some of the
same disadvantages as the civil law and common enemy rules;22 there-
fore the reasonable use rule should also be adopted in respect to rail-
roads.
Thomas H. Burnett
CONSTrrrmONAL LAW-%CnmNAL PnocE nRE-FEDmiAL INJuNCnON WmL
NOT IssuE TO PRomrr WnrAr EvuENcE iN STATE CouRTs-New York
police armed with an ex parte court order- tapped petitioner's tele-
phone. The petitioner, charged with the commission of several felonies,
sought injunctive relief against Bronx County, the District Attorney
and others to prevent introduction of wiretap evidence in state
1
7 Priest v. Boston & M.R.R., 71 N.H. 114, 51 Ad. 667 (1901). Under the
reasonable use rule, as stated by the Restatement, Torts § 833 (1988), if
defendants interference is unintentional, the rule governing negligent, reckless
and ultrahazardous conduct is applied.
18 Restatement, Torts §§ 827-28 (1938).
19 Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, 120 A.2d 4 (1956).
20 Ibid.
21 Kinyon & McClure, supra note 2, at 905-08.
22 Once the railroad has knowledge of the interference with surface water
caused by negligence in construction of the embankment, any subsequent inter-
ference is intentional and should be treated as such.
' Art. 1, § 12 of the New York Constitution permits the interception of
telephonic communications upon issuance of an ex parte court order. This con-
stitutional provision is implemented by N.Y. Code Crim. P. § 818(a).
The New York statute has been criticized for making authorizations to violate
federal law and denying its citizens the protection of a federal right. Even
proponents of restricted wiretapping criticize the New York law since any officer
above the rank of sergeant may make application to any judge so that all applica-
tions could be channeled through a willing judge. Note, 31 N.Y.L.J. 197, 204
(1956). See also Dash, Knowlton & Schwartz, The Eavesdroppers 85-166 (1959),
or complete coverage of the wiretapping problem in New York and other so-
called "permissive jurisdictions." They divide jurisdictions into three categories:
(1) Permissive-those in which wiretapping is expressly allowed to some extent,
2 Prohibition-those in which wiretapping is expressly forbidden, and (3) Virgin
-those which have no pertinent legislation on the subject.
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